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Law, Abortion and Rights 
Richard W. Schmude 
Mr. Schmude had six years of legal experience with the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, and for the past 16 years has worked as an attorney 
for the Humble Oil and Refining Company and Exxon Corporation in 
Houston. Director of Life Advocates, Inc., a Houston-based pro-life 
organization, he gave this address at the October, 1981 NFCPG 
meeting in San Antonio. 
Three centuries ago, John Locke, whose writing had a significant 
influence on the leaders of Revolutionary America, declared that 
"tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right," and that "where-ever 
law ends, tyranny begins" ("Second Treatise of Government," par. 
199, 202). On Jan. 22, 1973, with its decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973), the U.s. Supreme Court not only stripped from the 
unborn children of this state and this nation their legal statuses and 
rights, including the protections of the criminal law, but it also 
fashioned an affirmative right in their mothers to kill them by abor-
tion. Stated differently, the Court purported to transform a deliberate 
act of human killing - a naked evil- into a "fundamental" constitu-
tional "right." To the unwanted, unborn children of this state and this 
nation, and to most of those babies who are alive after abortions, 
death has become a way of life. Today in Texas, killing by abortion is 
wide open from conception to the commencement of childbirth. Did 
the Supreme Court exercise its power beyond right? 
I plan to share some thoughts with you concerning the Roe v. Wade 
decision, and how the Supreme Court, in deciding that case, turned its 
collective back on the U.s. Constitution, the principles on which this 
nation was founded and on its own constitutional teachings. 
I. Roe v. Wade 
In Roe v. Wade, the basic adversary clash was between a class of 
pregnant women in Texas and the district attorney of Dallas County, 
Henry Wade. Although the State of Texas participated in the case, it 
was not a party. In addition, the victims of abortions - unborn chil-
dren and children alive after abortions - were not parties. The preg-
nant women claimed that the Texas anti-abortion laws were unconsti-
tutional because those laws prevented them from obtaining safe, legal 
abortions. The basic holdings of the Supreme Court were these: 
1. The Texas anti-abortion laws are unconstitutional; 
2. The pregnant woman has a "fundamental right" to end her preg-
nancy by abortion; 
3. In the first trimester of pregnancy, that "right" is absolute; 
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4. From the first trimester to viability, the state can exert itself 
only in the interests of the woman, not the child; 
5. From viability to birth, the state may protect the child - if it 
wishes - except where the mother's life or health is involved. (In 
a companion case, Doe v. Bolton, the mother's health was 
defined so broadly that any protection afforded the viable child 
would be more form than substance.) 
6. The unborn child is not a person under the protection of the 
14th Amendment to the Constitution. 
The Court said it could not decide the "difficult question" of when 
human life began but, by referring to the unborn child as "potential 
life" or "the potentiality of life," and by resolving all doubt on the 
subject against the unborn child, the Court, in effect, concluded that 
human life began at birth. Through euphemisms and genteel language, 
the savagery of that decision was masked in this fashion: 
- killing by abortion became "termination of pregnancy," 
- the abortionist became the "attending physician," and 
- the victim of abortion became "potential life" or the "potential-
ity of life." 
At this juncture let's look at some of the constitutional aspects of 
Roe v. Wade. 
II. The Unconstitutionality of Roe v. Wade 
By way of background, it is a basic proposition of U.S. constitu-
tional law that if a court - any court - violates the U.8. Constitution 
in a case before it, that court loses jurisdiction over the underlying 
cause of action, and any "judgment" which it might render would be 
void. Examples are: Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-468 (1938); 
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277-284 (1876); Wetmore v. 
Karrick, 205 U.S. 141, 149-150 (1907); Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F. 2d 
205, 208-209 (C.A. 5, 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816. It is also 
basic that if a court proceeds without personal jurisdiction over a 
necessary party, the judgment of the court is void as to said party. Is 
the U.S. Supreme Court capable of violating the Constitution in its 
functionings? Yes, it is; and in the 1938 case of Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, the Court admitted that it had violated the 
Constitution and usurped power from the states when it decided the 
case of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842). 
Did the Court violate the Constitution when it decided Roe v. 
Wade? Let's look at the procedure and let's look at certain substantive 
aspects of that decision. 
A. Procedural Violations. From a standpoint of procedure, we see 
that the victims of abortion were not parties to the case nor were they 
represented therein through guardians, next friends or counsel. The 
victims of abortion are babies who are alive after abortion but who 
nevertheless die because of abortion, and unborn children. The abor-
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tion "survivors" are U.8. citizens under Section 1 of the 14th Amend-
ment because they are born in the U.S. and subject to its jurisdiction 
and unborn children have well-recognized legal personalities or 
statuses under English and American law. 
U.S. citizens who are affected directly by judicial proceedings have 
the clear right to be parties to such proceedings. So do unborn chil-
dren. In McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S . 340, 391-392, 404 (1885), the 
Supreme Court ruled that if unborn children were not represented in 
judicial proceedings which affected them, the judgment rendered in 
such proceedings would be void as to them. State courts have ruled 
similarly, e.g., Dietrick v. Migatt, 19 Ill. 146, 148 (S.C. Ill., 1857); 
Deal v. Sexton, 56 S.E. 691, 692 (S.C . N.C., 1907). This feature of 
representation for the unborn was not dreamed up by American 
courts. It was part of English law for centuries. In 1660, during the 
reign of Charles II, a father was given the right to appoint a guardian 
for his unborn child, and the guardian was authorized to sue on behalf 
of such child (12 Ch. II, c. 24, §§ VIII and IX). In Lutterel's Case, 
decided in 17th century England, an unborn child was awarded an 
injunction to prevent waste of the child's interest in certain real prop-
erty [Lutterel's Case, referred to in Hale v. Hale, 24 E. Repts. 25, 26 
(Ch., 1692)] . Except for Louisiana, we took our basic legal system 
- the common law - from England. 
From the lack of representation, two legal conclusions can be 
drawn readily: (1) the federal courts lacked personal jurisdiction over 
the victims of abortion, and hence Roe v. Wade is void as to them under 
well-established jurisdictional concepts [see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714 (1878)]; and (2) the victims of abortion were deprived by the 
federal courts of life, liberty and property without due process of law, 
in violation of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution. 
Let' us look further . In Roe, no evidence was presented on behalf of 
the victims of abortion, not even an affidavit. There was no trial, the 
case having been disposed of by way of summary judgment; and the 
victims of abortion were discriminated against invidiously when 
compared to the non-aborted born and to those constitutionally 
recognized "persons" called corporations. 
This, then, was the procedure used: no representation, no personal 
jurisdiction, no evidence, no trial and standards of invidious discrimin-
ation. The Supreme Court, however, has taught us that the "funda-
mental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard" 
[Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)], and that due process 
"must give ... an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the 
judgment sought" [Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 
(1884)]. The "due process" provisions of the 5th Amendment are 
mocked by Roe v. Wade. 
B. Certain Substantive Violations. Let's look at two substantive 
facets of Roe v. Wade: (1) the creation of the "liberty" to kill by 
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abortion, and (2) the effect of the exercise of that "liberty" upon the 
existence of the legally cognizable rights of the infant victims of 
abortion. 
1. Creation of the Liberty to Kill by Abortion. Since the U.S. 
Constitution does not give any human being the right to kill 
another human being, the Court had to discover - somehow - a 
right to kill by abortion in the Constitution. It did this by seizing 
upon the word "liberty" in the 14th Amendment, and it held that a 
pregnant woman's implied right of privacy included a liberty to kill 
her unborn child. It labeled this "liberty" a "fundamental right." 
Now, what is a fundamental right that the Constitution protects 
in its generalized expressions? The Supreme Court has given the 
answer in earlier decisions, namely, those rights which are rooted in 
the life and traditions of the people of this nation; and, through the 
years, various fundamental rights have been denominated and 
protected expressly. These include, in the family context, the rights 
to marry, to have children and to rear and educate one's child. 
How about a right to kill by abortion? Was that activity rooted in 
the life and traditions of the people of this nation? What does our 
legal and social heritage show? We, of course, took our basic legal 
system from England. This is how abortion was viewed under the 
English common law at the time of the adoption of our Constitu-
tion in 1789: 
a. If the mother died as a result of an abortion, regardless of the 
length of the pregnancy, the offense as to her was murder 
[Margaret Tinkler's Case (1781), I East, A Treatise of the Pleas 
of the Crown (Phil., 1806), pp. 230, 354-356] . 
b. If the child was born alive and afterwards died as a result of 
the abortion, regardless of the length of pregnancy, the offense 
as to the child was murder [see, e.g., Sim's Case, 75 E. Repts. 
1075 (Q.B., 1601) (dictum)]. 
c. If a child was killed in the womb as a result of an abortion, the 
offense as to the child was called "great misprison" (Coke), 
"heinous misdemeanor" (Blackstone), "horrible offense" 
(Coke) and "great crime" (Hale). And when was a child 
"alive"? Sir William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, gave us an answer based on the biology of 
the times (about 1765). He said: 
LIFE is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent 
by nature in every individual; and it begins in con-
templation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir 
in the mother's womb (I Bl., Com., p. 129). 
Abortion was prosecuted as a common law offense in this 
country. Examples include: Mills v. The Commonwealth, 13 Pa. St. 
630 (S.C. Pa., 1850); Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass 386 (S .J.C. 
Mass., O.T., 1812); see The People v. Jackson, 3 Hill 92, 94 (S.C. 
N.Y., May Term, 1842). When the 9th Amendment was adopted in 
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1791, the 14 states of this nation had received or adopted the 
English common law; and when the "liberty" provisions of the 14th 
Amendment were adopted in 1868, 36 states and territories of the 
U.S . had made abortion a statutory offense (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing in Roe v. Wade), and the few remaining U.S. jurisdictions which 
had not yet done so continued the common law offenses of abor-
tion (e.g. , North Carolina). 
Given this perspective, was the right to kill by abortion rooted in 
the life and traditions of the people of this nation? If not, where 
did the Supreme Court get the authority to make up such a 
"right"? The judicial article of the Constitution - Article III - gave 
it no such power. 
2. Effect of the Exercise of the Liberty to Kill on the Legal 
Rights of the Victims. Under English law, the unborn child was 
recognized expressly and impliedly under statutory and case law. In 
addition to the life right, the English courts recognized the unborn 
child as having numerous other rights - both vested and contingent 
upon live birth - such as representation in judicial proceedings, 
taking property under a will, taking property under a trust, taking 
property under marriage articles, and taking property by inheri-
tance in certain situations. 
In the great English case of Thellusson v. Woodford, decided in 
1799 (31 E. Repts. 117) and affirmed by the House of Lords in 
1805 (8 Rev. Repts. 104), Justice Buller, in answering the conten-
tion that an unborn child was a non-entity, said: 
Let us see wha t this non· entity can do. He may be 
vouched in a recovery . . .. He may be an executor. He 
may take under the Statute of Distributions (22 & 23 ch. 
11 c. 10). He may take by devise. He may have an injunc· 
tion : and he may have a guardian (p. 163). 
The fact that many of these rights were contingent upon live 
birth is of no great moment, for the law recognizes and protects 
many forms of contingent or future property interests, such as 
springing uses, shifting uses, executory devices, contingent 
remainders, and inchoate dower. 
In this country, the legal status and rights posture of unborn 
children became part of our law through reception or adoption 
of the English common law. The law relative to unborn children has 
been expanded greatly by federal and state statutory and case law. 
For example, the pre-natal tort injury doctrine is law in all 51 
domestic U.S. jurisdictions. Can there be a "duty of care," which is 
central to the tort of negligence, to a non-entity? In addition to 
recognition under the laws of inheritance, wills, trusts and torts, 
various state courts have held that an unborn child is entitled to 
support [e.g., Metzger v. People, 53 P. 2d 1189, 1192 (S.C. Colo., 
1936)], to a life-saving blood transfusion [e.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul 
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Morgan Mem. Hosp. u. Anderson, 201 A. 2d 537, 538 (S.C. N.J., 
1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985], to have a life-saving Caesarean 
operation performed upon the mother [e.g., Jefferson u. Griffin 
Spalding Co. Hosp. Auth., No. 37244 (S.C. Ga., 1981)], and to be 
represented in judicial proceedings [e.g., Utah Copper Co. u. Indus. 
Com., 193 P. 24, 33-34 (S.C. Utah, 1920)] . Unborn children are 
recognized under various social or compensatory laws, such as the 
Social Security Act, the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act and State 
Wrongful Death laws, e.g., Wagner u. Finch 413 F. 2d 267, 268-269 
(C.A.5, 1969); Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n. u. Shea, 410 F. 2d 56, 
61, 62 (C.A. 5, 1969); Sox u. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465, 469, 
470 (E.D.S.C., 1960). In Brantley u. Boone, 34 S.W. 2d 409, 411 
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland, 1931), no writ, which is a Texas case, an 
unborn child took a wrongful death award on the death of his 
father. 
In the 1972 Lynch case, the U.S. Supreme Court declared: 
"Property does not have rights. People have rights" [Lynch u. 
H.F.C., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972)]. Well, if that's true, unborn 
children are people because they have legally cognizable rights. 
The exercise of the woman's abortion "right" operates quite 
clearly to the naked destruction of all of such rights of the unborn 
child. How can the Supreme Court - or any federal court - which 
sits primarily to adjust rights and to dispense justice authorize the 
wholesale depriuation of such rights? To do so is to wage war on the 
due process clause of the 5th Amendment, the rights of the people 
under the 9th Amendment, the rights of the states under the 
"division of powers" concept as guaranteed by the 10th Amend-
ment, the rights of Congress, and the very duties of the judiciary 
under Articles III and VI of the Constitution. 
Against this background, we see that: 
- the victims of abortion were not represented in the very 
proceedings which spelled death to them; 
- the federal courts lacked personal jurisdiction over such 
victims; 
- no evidence was offered on behalf of the victims; 
- there was no trial; 
- the Supreme Court stripped the unborn child of his or her 
well-recognized legal status; 
- the Supreme Court deprived nakedly the unborn child of all 
of his or her legally cognizable rights, including rights pro-
vided for or recognized by federal statutory law; and 
- the Supreme Court manufactured a constitutional right out 
of a beastly criminal act. 
Roe u. Wade is the most sauage and shocking abuse of judicial 
authority on record. It stands as a solemn fraud on the U.S. 
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Constitution, the principles on which this nation was based, the 
Court's own constitutional teachings, and the rights of the victims. 
Others who have studied the Roe decision have come to similar 
conclusions. Prof. John Hart Ely of Yale Law School, who favors 
abortion, said that Roe v. Wade "is a very bad decision. It is bad 
because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not 
constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try 
to be" [82 Yale L.J. 920, 947 (1973)] (emphasis in original). 
Former U.S. Solicitor General Robert Bork said that Roe v. Wade 
was noteworthy "because it is not grounded on law, only social 
policy." Prof. John Noonan, Jr. of the University of California Law 
School at Berkeley said: 
The liberty established by The Abortion Cases has no foundation 
in the Constitution of the United States. It was established by an 
act of raw judicial power. Its establishment was illegitimate and 
unprincipled, the imposition of the personal belief of seven justices 
on the women and men of fifty states. The continuation of the 
liberty is a continuing affront to constitutional government in this 
country [Noonan, A Private Choice (1979), p . 189). 
III. Roe v. Wade and the Future 
Where can Roe v. Wade take us? If human life can be defined out of 
legal existence at one end of the life spectrum, it can be so defined at 
the other end, and at intermediate points. In stripping the unborn 
child of his legal status, the Court used the "person not in the whole 
sense" tack. How about the aged? Can it be said that they are not 
persons in the whole sense? Or the chronically ill? Or the handi-
capped? Or the newborn? Do they have the same "quality of life" 
characteristics as those not in such categories? Professor Noonan has 
written: 
No "discrete and insular minority" can feel secure when its constitutional 
existence may be affected by the exercise of such raw power. And we are all 
m embers of discrete and insular minorities, depending on the criterion 
employed to set up the categories. The population may be divided a 
thousand ways to suit the preferences of the judges, who have power to 
define who is a person, who have even power to declare who is alive. If it 
becomes settled that it is the Supreme Court's will that confers personhood 
and existence, no one is safe (ibid.) 
In her book, Land Where Our Fathers Died, Marian L. Starkey, in 
reviewing the accomplishments of America, asks certain questions of 
our founding fathers: "Are we finding what you prayed for, William 
Bradford, John Winthrop? . .. Are you content, James Oglethorpe, 
you who alone among the founding fathers lived to see the nation you 
helped create? If we have not yet realized your hopes, your prayers, 
take heart, for beyond us lies yet a newer beginning." The question I 
leave with you is simply this: Will you help bring to this nation a 
newer beginning? 
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